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Labor Movements in Tunisia and Egypt 
Drivers vs. Objects of Change in Transition from Authoritarian Rule 
Dina Bishara 
Egyptian and Tunisian unions have played radically different roles in their countries’ 
transition from authoritarian rule since the ouster of longstanding Presidents Hosni 
Mubarak and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in early 2011. The legacy of different variations 
of authoritarian rule as well as the history of the respective labor movements has had 
significant consequences for their ability to shape post-transition politics. Whereas 
the Egyptian labor movement is fragmented, and control over labor organizations has 
become a battlefield for competing political forces in Egypt, organized labor emerged 
as an actor in its own right, playing a leading role in the Tunisian transition by miti-
gating political conflict and helping to move the process along. In both Tunisia and 
Egypt, “official” unions will need to address issues of internal reform to become more 
effective representatives of their members’ interests. In addition, the legal framework 
will have to be significantly altered, at least in Egypt. German and European policy-
makers, unions, and political foundations should support steps toward more effective 
and empowered unions that can represent workers’ rights by encouraging legal reform 
and supporting independent unions through training and exchange. 
 
Both Egyptian and Tunisian workers par-
ticipated massively in the uprisings leading 
to the ouster of longstanding presidents in 
early 2011. Although the Egyptian Trade 
Union Federation (ETUF) discouraged Egyp-
tian workers from participating, workers 
staged nationwide strikes and protests in 
the three days prior to Mubarak’s ouster in 
February 2011, placing added pressure on 
the Egyptian military to respond to popular 
mobilization. The Tunisian General Labor 
Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Tra-
vail, UGTT), especially its local branches, 
played a key role in supporting anti-Ben 
Ali protests. 
Since the ouster of Mubarak and Ben Ali, 
both Egypt and Tunisia have witnessed the 
emergence of a multiplicity of new unions 
and union confederations, posing a chal-
lenge to established unions. In Egypt, the 
increase in the number of unions has not 
been matched by any changes in the legal 
framework governing labor organization. In 
Tunisia, despite a more permissive legal en-
vironment, new unions have been struggling 
to compete with an organizational power-
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ful and resource-rich UGTT. In both coun-
tries, the post-Mubarak and Ben Ali periods 
have seen a great deal of workers’ mobiliza-
tion in the face of deteriorating economic 
conditions. According to Kamal Abbas, 
head of the Center for Trade Unions and 
Workers’ Services, more than 4,500 fac-
tories across Egypt have closed since the 
January 2011 uprising, resulting in 12,000 
workers losing their jobs. In Tunisia, un-
employment rates have increased from 
around 13 percent in May 2010 to 17.6 
percent in January 2013, and food prices 
have increased by 8 percent from the end 
of 2010 to the end of 2012. 
Different authoritarian legacies 
To understand the challenges that Egypt’s 
and Tunisia’s unions are faced with today 
and the roles that they can play in the tran-
sition, one has to understand their histories 
and their positions at the time of national 
independence. The ETUF is the product 
of the post-independence regime in Egypt 
and was created by President Gamal Abdul 
Nasser in 1957 as a tool to control workers’ 
discontent. Under Nasser, rank-and-file 
workers were given economic benefits, in-
cluding job security, in exchange for their 
political quiescence. Within the frame-
work of a state-dominated economy, unions 
played no collective bargaining role but 
were rather used as instruments for politi-
cal control. The ETUF was given monopoly 
over workers’ representation, and the for-
mation of more than one union per profes-
sion or industry was prohibited by law. The 
ETUF’s leadership enjoyed access to sub-
stantial institutional resources. Critics in 
the independent labor community charge 
that this led to rampant corruption with-
in the organization, especially at higher 
leadership levels. Nasser’s successors con-
tinued to use the ETUF as a tool to maintain 
control over workers while retrenching the 
economic benefits previously bestowed 
upon workers. 
In the last 10 years of Mubarak’s rule, the 
ETUF’s leadership was increasingly seen as 
ever more subservient to the regime and 
unwilling to defend workers’ interests. In 
addition, there were allegations that the 
regime had interfered more heavily in 
union elections beyond the level of the top 
leadership. This had the effect of further 
isolating the ETUF leadership from rank-
and-file concerns as well as driving activists 
to press for their demands outside official 
ETUF channels. Frustrated with official 
channels of representation, angered by the 
adverse effects of the accelerating pace of 
economic liberalization in the mid-2000s, 
and emboldened by the decrease in the 
government’s violent repression of workers’ 
mobilization, Egyptian workers staged an 
unprecedented number of protests in the 
2004–2011 period. These strikes and pro-
tests occurred largely without the support 
of the ETUF leadership. Nearly two years 
before Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011, 
a group of real estate tax collectors formed 
Egypt’s first independent union since 1957, 
thereby directly challenging the state 
corporatist system in place. Within two 
years, three groups – namely pensioners, 
teachers, and health technicians – had 
followed suit. 
In Tunisia, by contrast, the UGTT was 
formed in 1946, that is, 10 years prior to 
independence. Indeed, the UGTT’s major 
role in the struggle for Tunisia’s indepen-
dence made it difficult for the regime of 
Habib Bourguiba to bring it under its com-
plete control, as the union’s bases main-
tained a commitment to the UGTT’s inde-
pendence from Tunisia’s rulers. Over the 
years, the UGTT experienced a great deal of 
internal struggle that resulted in relations 
with Tunisia’s authoritarian regimes vary-
ing between periods of tight political coop-
eration and periods of relative autonomy. 
The most contentious times in the relation 
between the UGTT and Tunisia’s rulers 
include 1978 and 1985, when the UGTT 
openly opposed the regime’s economic 
policies and engaged in militant activities. 
In January 1978, the UGTT organized a gen-
eral strike, resulting in severe repression 
and the imprisonment of the organization’s 
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secretary general. On other occasions, how-
ever, especially during the 1960s and 1990s, 
the UGTT vowed to respect the regime’s 
economic policies and restrain workers’ 
activism. In addition, the UGTT’s leadership 
demonstrated its loyalty to Ben Ali by sup-
porting his presidential campaigns in 1995 
and 1999. Nevertheless, even during peri-
ods where the top leadership was loyal to 
Ben Ali, the UGTT’s local branches managed 
to retain a certain level of independence. 
Still, local UGTT branches did not support 
the 2008 revolt in the Gafsa mining basin. 
The revolt, which lasted over a period of six 
months, involved a wide range of activists 
who protested unemployment and the eco-
nomic marginalization of the region. It was 
harshly repressed by security forces. 
In sum, while the ETUF had become 
a tool of political control of workers for 
Egypt’s authoritarian rulers, the UGTT 
proved to be a much less pliant organiza-
tion. On the eve of the January 2011 up-
risings in Egypt and Tunisia, the UGTT 
therefore had much greater credibility as 
a national actor with a history of relative 
autonomy and militancy at key junctures 
in Tunisian history than the largely dis-
credited ETUF. In January 2011, the ETUF 
actively discouraged Egyptian workers from 
participating in anti-regime protests. The 
UGTT, on the other hand, played a key role 
in organizing anti-Ben Ali protests, despite 
the fact that the organization’s top leader-
ship did not formally endorse these protests 
until two weeks into the uprising. Here, 
the activism of the UGTT’s local branches 
forced the executive bureau to eventually 
support anti-Ben Ali protests. 
Egypt’s embattled labor 
In the wake of Mubarak’s ouster, a largely 
discredited official trade union organiza-
tion was confronted with an ever growing 
effort by long-time activists to revitalize the 
realm of trade union affairs and competi-
tion among political actors over the control 
of labor organizations. As a result, the post-
Mubarak era turned out to be a period of 
greater contestation over the rules gover-
ning trade union affairs rather than an op-
portunity for the labor movement to assert 
itself as an actor with agency of its own. 
Labor activists saw the revolution as an 
opportunity to push for freedom of organi-
zation, both in practice and on the legal 
front. On 30 January 2011, in the midst of 
the 18-day uprising, independent unions 
established under Mubarak announced the 
establishment of the Egyptian Federation 
of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU). The 
number of independent unions has expo-
nentially increased since. In late 2013, 
EFITU claimed a membership of around 
300 unions. The Egyptian Democratic Labor 
Congress (EDLC) was also formed in the 
aftermath of the January 2011 uprising and 
formally established as an independent 
trade union federation with a proclaimed 
membership of 300 unions in April 2013. 
For the first time in Egypt’s contem-
porary history, the ETUF’s monopoly over 
workers’ representation was thus broken, 
in practice if not in law. The EFITU and the 
EDLC have received international recogni-
tion from organizations such as the Inter-
national Labour Organization, the Inter-
national Trade Union Confederation, and 
Public Services International. In addition 
and in contrast to the ETUF, they boast a 
democratically elected leadership, which 
makes them legitimate representatives of 
their members’ interests. 
Legal and organizational challenges 
Yet, the nascent independent unions face 
a myriad of organizational and legal ob-
stacles that make it extremely difficult 
for them to effectively represent workers’ 
rights, let alone exert political influence 
during the transition. Independent unions 
remain in legal limbo, given the fact that 
trade union affairs in Egypt continue to be 
governed by law no. 35 (1976), which bans 
the establishment of more than one union 
per profession or industry. This effectively 
means that independent unions have diffi-
culties collecting membership fees and 
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gaining the recognition of employers’ rep-
resentatives and administrations. 
Independent labor activists’ efforts to 
push for major legal reforms have been 
met with stiff resistance from Egypt’s new 
rulers as well as the official unions that 
have a vested interest in maintaining the 
status quo. Both the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces (SCAF), which ruled Egypt 
from February 2011 to June 2012, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
Party (FJP), which was in power until early 
July 2013, resisted the passing of a new 
trade union law. 
Notably, Egypt’s post-Mubarak rulers not 
only resisted the passage of a more liberal 
union law, they appeared set to restrict 
workers’ right to organize strikes and pro-
tests. As early as March 2011, the SCAF 
approved a decree issued by the Egyptian 
cabinet, criminalizing protests that disrupt 
work. The transition government installed 
by the military in July 2013 has enacted a 
controversial protest law that places restric-
tions on workers’ ability to organize and 
puts them at risk of imprisonment for their 
involvement in strikes. 
In the absence of effective formal chan-
nels of communication with employers, 
including the state, workers have had to 
organize strikes and protests to raise their 
demands. In addition, independent union-
ists have also relied on mass mobilization 
as a tool to exert pressure on the relevant 
authorities to recognize them as legitimate 
representatives of their members’ interests. 
Yet, the need to invest in organization-
building and the fragmentation of the in-
dependent union scene undermine their 
capacity to exert political pressure, at least 
in the short run. Divisions over strategies or 
personal differences have made it more dif-
ficult for the two independent trade union 
federations created after Mubarak’s ouster 
to collectively advance their shared goals. 
These goals include the passage of a new 
trade union law that would guarantee trade 
union pluralism, realizing constitutional 
clauses that support workers’ rights, as well 
as improving workers’ economic conditions. 
Government interference 
In addition, the power struggle that has 
plagued Egypt’s transitional politics 
has been reflected in the struggle over the 
redefinition of the rules governing interest 
representation in post-Mubarak Egypt. Trade 
union affairs have thus emerged as a major 
arena of political struggle, rendering the 
organizations the targets of political con-
testation rather than drivers of reform. 
Under Morsi’s rule, the FJP tried to use 
corporatist arrangements in place for polit-
ical control. Thus, the appointment of an 
FJP member, Khaled al-Azhari, as minister 
of manpower in Morsi’s first cabinet, which 
otherwise only included a handful of FJP-
affiliated ministers, was a clear indication 
that the FJP wanted to have a strong say in 
labor affairs. Also, the FJP put forward a 
draft law on labor unions that would have 
prohibited the establishment of new profes-
sional unions, preserved the structure of 
centralized decision-making within the 
ETUF, and made it difficult for workers to 
leave the ETUF without risking losing their 
access to social funds. The close connection 
between ETUF membership and access to 
these funds poses significant obstacles for 
the emergence of independent unions. 
In a further move to expand control 
over workers’ organizations, President Morsi 
issued decree no. 97 in November 2012, 
introducing important amendments to 
Egypt’s 1976 labor law. The amendments 
included a provision to remove any ETUF 
board member over the age of 60. This 
move was meant to revitalize the organi-
zation by introducing new figures and 
removing Mubarak-era unionists. Most con-
troversially, however, the decree gave the 
minister of manpower the right to nomi-
nate replacement candidates. As such, the 
decree signaled Morsi’s willingness to use 
executive power to intervene in trade union 
affairs, thereby continuing with – rather 
than breaking – the authoritarian practices 
of the past. The FJP then tried to use its 
position of power to strengthen its foothold 
in the ETUF, by stacking the organization’s 
executive board and federation-level boards 
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with unionists sympathetic to its own 
ideological orientation. 
Following President Morsi’s ouster in 
July 2013, the political struggle over trade 
union affairs in Egypt continued. In a sur-
prising development, Kamal Abu Eita, 
former head of the independent union for 
real estate tax collectors, replaced Khaled 
al-Azhari as minister of manpower. It is not 
entirely clear what motivated the military-
installed government’s decision to appoint 
Abu Eita to this position. Given his history 
of activism and his popularity in the in-
dependent trade union movement, his 
appointment can be viewed as an attempt 
by Egypt’s new political leadership to court 
the independent trade union movement. 
Much like his FJP predecessor, however, 
Abu Eita was charged with using his posi-
tion to change the composition of the 
ETUF’s executive board. Soon after his ap-
pointment, a struggle erupted within the 
ETUF that resulted in the ousting of the 
organization’s president, Gibali al-Maraghi, 
and several Muslim Brotherhood unionists 
from the ETUF’s executive board. In fact, 80 
percent of the ETUF’s executive board mem-
bers were replaced. Although it is not clear 
who was behind the reshuffling, it is clear 
that Abu Eita endorsed the decision. Both 
Abu Eita and Abdul Fatah Ibrahim, the new-
ly-selected ETUF president, deny Abu Eita’s 
involvement in the reshuffling and insist 
that the process was legally sound. Still, 
some activists in the independent labor 
community argue that the reshuffling con-
tinues a tradition of executive interference 
in union affairs. 
The UGTT’s mediating role 
Much like in Egypt, the 2010/2011 uprising 
in Tunisia was a catalyst for increased work-
ers’ organization. Since then, three major 
trade union federations have been formed 
or legalized in addition to the UGTT, as well 
as several smaller ones. The Tunisian Gen-
eral Labor Confederation (Confédération 
Générale Tunisienne du Travail, CGTT), 
which had been formed back in 2006, was 
legalized in 2011. Founded by former UGTT 
activist Habib Guiza, the CGTT champions 
trade union pluralism and advocates giving 
workers viable alternatives for representa-
tion. According to CGTT officials, the orga-
nization has increased its membership 
from 10,000 in 2011 to 50,000 in 2013. In 
May 2011, The Union of Tunisian Workers 
was formed by former UGTT Secretary 
General Ismail al-Sihbani. Al-Sihbani had 
resigned from his position in 2000 follow-
ing internal struggles, accusations of 
authoritarian practices, and corruption 
charges. A third trade union federation, 
the Organisation Tunisienne du Travail, is 
thought to be affiliated with the Islamist 
Ennahda movement, given that it was 
formed by Islamist unionists. Ennahda lead-
ers, however, deny any organizational links 
between the party and the federation. 
In contrast to Egypt, the emergence of 
the independent unions in Tunisia has not 
posed a significant challenge to the UGTT’s 
status as the strongest and most organized 
union federation. Although they present 
some competition to the UGTT and offer its 
discontented bases with viable alternatives, 
due to the UGTT’s history of relative inde-
pendence, the UGTT has retained a great 
deal of credibility in the post-Ben Ali peri-
od. In addition, many UGTT activists are 
committed to reforming the organization 
from within because they value its history 
and are keen on maintaining its legacy. 
It is worth noting that, unlike Egyptian 
law, Tunisian law recognizes trade union 
pluralism; though, in practice, no union 
confederation other than the UGTT was 
legalized before Ben Ali’s ouster. In the 
post-Ben Ali period, new union confeder-
ations have been legalized but they face 
tremendous obstacles in competing with 
the UGTT, given its large membership base 
and superior financial resources. In addi-
tion, only the UGTT has been allowed to 
take part in collective bargaining proce-
dures, and the new confederations remain 
excluded from tripartite negotiations with 
the government and Tunisia’s largest busi-
ness association. This again is a difference 
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to Egypt, where no regular practice of tri-
partite negotiations exists. Activists in the 
new confederations argue that both the 
UGTT and Ennahda do not support trade 
union pluralism in Tunisia. UGTT activists 
deny such accusations but insist that the 
unions representing the greatest number 
of workers per sector should be the ones 
involved in collective bargaining. Ennahda 
officials recognize the legality of trade 
union pluralism but argue that it frag-
ments workers and weakens the union 
movement. 
The UGTT as a mediator 
Beyond representing workers’ concerns, 
in the post-Ben Ali period, the UGTT has 
emerged as a national actor and assumed 
a mediating role between various political 
parties, among other methods by brokering 
several rounds of national dialogue to 
help mitigate the political crisis in Tunisia. 
Three sources of strength have positioned 
the Tunisian UGTT to play a leading medi-
ating role in post-Ben Ali politics: the 
UGTT’s political clout, its organizational 
strength, and its history of militancy. 
First, given the UGTT’s history and its 
role in the national independence move-
ment, the UGTT perceives itself – and is 
perceived by many Tunisian activists and 
political observers – as being a constitutive 
player in the national development project. 
As such, UGTT activists resist a strict differ-
entiation between the unionist and nation-
alist dimensions of the UGTT’s activism. 
In this sense, the UGTT’s prominent role in 
Tunisia’s current transition is seen as an 
extension rather than a departure from its 
historic role, even though the UGTT’s cur-
rent political involvement is much deeper 
than before. 
Second, the UGTT is one of Tunisia’s 
most powerful players in organizational 
terms. The UGTT’s membership has almost 
doubled (from 350,000 to 700,000 mem-
bers) since Ben Ali’s ouster, with the inclu-
sion of workers without permanent con-
tracts into the UGTT. The UGTT’s extensive 
geographic reach and its ability to mobilize 
thousands of members render it more 
powerful than many of Tunisia’s current 
political parties. 
Third, given the lack of political plural-
ism under Tunisia’s authoritarian regimes, 
the UGTT had become a haven for political 
activists who often turned to union activ-
ism as a main outlet for political activism. 
Even political activists not involved in 
union activism had turned to the UGTT for 
support. The UGTT thus acted as an um-
brella organization that supported politi-
cal activists and took up issues such as the 
struggle for human rights and general 
freedoms. Having filled a sort of political 
vacuum under successive authoritarian 
regimes, the UGTT acquired a great deal 
of political clout. 
Indeed, despite having some reservations 
concerning the current role of the UGTT, 
most political parties have a lot of respect 
for the UGTT and applaud its attempt to 
bridge political differences during the un-
folding political crisis. Notably, the coun-
try’s main political parties have agreed to 
participate in the national dialogue spon-
sored by the so-called quartet (comprised of 
the UGTT; the Tunisian League for Human 
Rights; the Tunisian Union for Industry, 
Trade and Handicrafts; and the National 
Bar Association) in September 2013. In 
addition, there is widespread recognition 
that only an organization of the stature of 
the UGTT could play such a mediating role. 
However, the UGTT’s efforts did not 
always yield success. Indeed, the Ennahda 
party refused to join a round of national 
dialogue initiated by the UGTT in February 
2013, citing the participation of certain 
parties it considered illegitimate, such 
as Nidaa Tounes, led by Beji Caid Essebsi, 
minister of interior under President Bour-
guiba and Tunisia’s interim prime minister 
following the resignation of Mohammed 
Ghannoushi in February 2011. Ennahda 
did, however, agree to participate in the 
latest round of dialogue organized by the 
UGTT following the July 2013 assassination 
of Mohammed Brahmi, former leader and 
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founder of the People’s Movement party. 
During this round of dialogue, the UGTT 
presented a “roadmap,” outlining a number 
of measures to get out of the political dead-
lock that had plagued the country. The 
roadmap also provided a timeline for the 
government’s resignation and steps toward 
the selection of a more consensual govern-
ment. 
In December 2013, after months of polit-
ical deadlock and weeks of negotiations, 
Tunisia’s national dialogue resulted in the 
nomination of Mahdi Jomaa as head of a 
caretaker government that is supposed 
to replace the Ennahda-led government. 
Jomaa’s election was not consensual, how-
ever, highlighting ongoing disagreements 
among Tunisia’s political parties. He 
received 9 out of 11 votes, but parties of 
the major opposition bloc, the National 
Salvation Front, as well as Nidaa Tounes 
abstained from the vote because Jomaa 
was already the minister of industry in 
the Ennahda-led government and thus 
perceived as close to Ennahda. With the 
nomination of a caretaker government 
being only one of the first steps in the im-
plementation of the roadmap, it is foresee-
able that the process will continue to be 
difficult. 
Challenges to the UGTT 
Despite its strengths, the UGTT faces a num-
ber of challenges as it assumes such a prom-
inent political role. These include the need 
to balance its political and social functions 
as well as the need to address internal re-
form issues, competition from newly-formed 
trade union federations, and greater vulner-
ability to criticism from political parties. 
By choosing to prioritize its political over 
its social role at this juncture, the UGTT 
risks taking steps that might alienate its 
bases, such as committing to maintaining 
the social peace without consulting them. 
Critics also point to the fact that the UGTT 
has not paid sufficient attention to social 
issues as a result of its current engulfment 
in political affairs. At the level of the local 
branches, there is a sense that the UGTT’s 
political commitments may place con-
straints on the leadership’s capacity to 
negotiate on behalf of its bases in a timely 
manner. For instance, workers with tem-
porary contracts mobilized in November 
2013 to demand permanent contracts, but 
negotiations over their demands were 
delayed because the UGTT’s central leader-
ship was not available to attend the nego-
tiations. Given the pressing nature of some 
of the issues involved, it is likely that the 
organization’s bases may become aggravat-
ed by such delays. 
The UGTT’s political involvement has 
also come at the cost of addressing serious 
internal reform issues. These include 
internal corruption, the underrepresenta-
tion of women in the organization’s leader-
ship positions, issues of internal democra-
cy, and membership expansion. Even those 
sympathetic to the UGTT point to the need 
for a serious effort in dealing with internal 
corruption issues. There also is recognition 
that decision-making within the UGTT is 
still dominated by men and that it will 
require significant efforts to reverse the 
prevailing organizational culture. This 
is linked to broader concerns regarding 
internal democracy. 
Finally, the UGTT’s leading role in trying 
to resolve the current political crisis exposes 
it to a wider range of criticism, especially 
from political parties. Ennahda representa-
tives have warned, for instance, that the 
UGTT risks becoming a partisan player by 
allying itself closer with the leftist political 
parties. Ennahda was also critical of the 
UGTT’s reliance on street mobilization as a 
tool to pressure the government, especially 
prior to the start of the July 2013 national 
dialogue round. For their part, some leftist 
forces have complained that the UGTT has 
not done enough to champion revolution-
ary goals and instead chosen to take a more 
consensual approach. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
The legacy of authoritarian rule in Tunisia 
and Egypt as well as the pre-independence 
history of labor activism has played an 
important role in conditioning the 
opportunities available for workers’ 
organizations in the two cases of transition 
from authoritarian rule. It would be 
mistaken, however, to assume that such 
legacies determine the course of workers’ 
activism in both countries. 
In the short to medium term, the rules 
governing workers’ representation in Egypt 
will remain highly contested. There are 
indications that Egypt will not easily move 
beyond its history of corporatism, given 
entrenched interests in old union struc-
tures and fears among Egypt’s rulers of 
losing control over workers. 
Workers need to have effective organiza-
tions that can channel their interests in 
order to avoid frequent recourse to strikes 
and protests as the primary means to air 
their grievances. This can only be done 
through legal changes that allow for free-
dom of organization, ensure that new 
unions are recognized by both the state and 
private employers, and remove any restric-
tions on the new unions’ ability to collect 
membership fees and thus the opportunity 
to build financially viable organizations. 
The question as to whether trade union 
pluralism is a necessary step to ensure 
freedom of organization remains extremely 
controversial in Egypt. Critics typically 
argue that it would weaken workers’ pow-
er, while advocates hold that it would 
ensure that Egypt will move beyond state 
control of workers’ organizations and that 
competition among unions would only 
benefit workers. Regardless of one’s posi-
tion, however, it is clear that Egyptian 
workers should be permitted a voice in 
shaping any future legal framework con-
cerning their representation. 
In Tunisia, as in Egypt, workers face 
increasingly strained economic conditions, 
and unions will need to play a more active 
role in bringing socio-economic issues to 
the forefront of transition politics. Given 
the credibility of the UGTT, the organiza-
tion is well-positioned to propose recom-
mendations concerning the country’s 
economic policy. The UGTT will remain a 
pivotal player in the transition as it con-
tinues to mediate deep political divisions 
between Tunisia’s political parties. At the 
same time, however, the UGTT will have to 
maintain a delicate balance between its 
political engagement and its socio-eco-
nomic agenda. If successful in its mediating 
efforts, this will ease the pressure on the 
organization and boost its credibility, both 
among its bases and the wider Tunisian 
public. In the long-term, however, the UGTT 
will need to address issues of internal 
reform as well as resume its social role 
more vigorously in order to avoid internal 
dissent and splintering. 
European policymakers should support 
workers’ rights by encouraging the 
adoption of a new trade union law in Egypt 
that guarantees freedom of organization 
and by addressing the issue of the privileges 
that “official” unions (ETUF and UGTT) 
have. European NGOs already working with 
Egyptian and Tunisian unions, such as the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, should con-
tinue to support new independent unions 
by providing training in areas such as 
collective bargaining and union manage-
ment as well as encourage the consolida-
tion of mechanisms for internal union 
democracy. They might also be able to offer 
guidance on the question of trade union 
pluralism, drawing on the variety of repre-
sentational models adopted across Euro-
pean countries. In addition, they should 
support the established union federations 
to address issues of internal reform. Finally, 
these organizations may also encourage 
independent activists from new union 
federations to coordinate campaigns with 
regards to shared goals. 
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